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Political Institutions and Economic Policies: Lessons
from Africa
MACARTAN HUMPHREYS AND ROBERT BATES*
Many assert that the economic problems of Africa possess political origins. In particular, they point to a lack
of political accountability and argue that economic reform and the renewal of growth depend upon political
reform and in particular upon the promotion of competitive electoral politics. Summarizing these arguments,
this article formalizes and tests them, using both an African and global sample of data. While it ﬁnds support
for the view that within Africa – and globally – competitive institutions are associated with less extractive
policies, it ﬁnds no evidence that these institutions have facilitated the implementation of Washington
consensus policies.
Writing half a decade ago, Easterly and Levine spoke of Africa’s ‘Growth Tragedy’.
1
What Easterly and Levine described in 1997 remains true today: Africa poses the
development challenge of our time.
In periods of rapid development – such as the 1960s – growth rates in Africa lagged
behindthoseinotherregions;inperiodsofslowgrowth–suchasthe1980s–growthrates
in Africa turned negative. In recent decades, large parts of the continent have become
poorer, both relative to other regions and in absolute terms. While incomes in Africa were
approximately equivalent to those in Asia in 1950, incomes in Africa had fallen to
approximately one quarter those of the latter region by the early 1990s.
2 Table 1 shows
thegrowthratesoftheeconomiesoftheworld,dividedbyregionandera.Africa’sgrowth
tragedy, it can be seen, has been deep and sustained.
In this article we explore political determinants of Africa’s economic performance. In
particular,wefocusonthepoliciesofitsgovernmentsandontheinstitutionsthatinﬂuence
their policy choices. In Part I, we review the literature, focusing on arguments that
emphasize the economic importance of public policies. In Part II, we explore the logic of
political accountability, thus linking political institutions to policy choices; the analysis
impingesdirectlyonthedebateslinkingeconomicdevelopmenttopoliticalreform.InPart
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Smita Singh, Richard Tucker, John Gerring and Irene Yackovlev for their help and advice. Special thanks go to
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1 W. Easterly and R. Levine, ‘Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions’, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112 (1997), 1203–50.
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that Maddison reports the arithmetic mean of per capita income across a sample of countries (10 for Africa, 11
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III, we test our arguments. In doing so, we relate data on the institutional features of
governments to their choice of policies, drawing on both African and global samples.
PART I: PERSPECTIVES
Many reasons have been offered for Africa’s poor growth performance. Some, such as
SachsandWarner,focusonAfrica’snaturalendowment:itstropicallocation,itsresources,
and its position in global markets.
3 Others, such as Easterly and Levine, point to Africa’s
cultural endowment, and in particular to the number and fractionalization of ethnic
groupings.
4 Still others point to political factors and emphasize the quality of governance
in Africa. This essay focuses on this last interpretation.
In doing so, it focuses on three literatures: one arising from qualitative accounts by
political scientists and African intellectuals; a second from the efforts of economists to
estimate cross-national growth equations; and a third from the international ﬁnancial
community.
Qualitative Accounts
Intheimmediatepost-independenceperiod,scholars,suchasWalterRodney
5andpolitical
leaders,suchasKwameNkrumah,
6emphasizedthepoliticaldeterminantsoftheeconomic
performanceofAfrica.Theypointedtotheimpactofexternalforces,suchascolonialrule
and the dependent position of Africa in the world order. Noting the growing disparity
between the economic performance of the African nations and that of nations in regions
with similar legacies and positions in the global economy, later scholars focused on
internal determinants of economic behaviour in Africa.
7 Some, such as Rene Dumont and
Robert Bates have stressed the tendency of governments to adopt policies that sacriﬁced
the public interest for private advantage.
8 Still others, like Claude Ake, cite the lack of
political accountability on the part of Africa’s governments.
9
Case studies lend support to the last set of arguments. In both Nigeria and Ghana, for
example, military governments, being immune to electoral challenge, engaged in the
wholesale looting of the national treasury. In Nigeria, the government of General Abacha
diverted over $2 billion of Nigeria’s export earnings from the oil industry to private bank
accounts abroad. In Ghana, the government of General Acheampong generated massive
budgetary deﬁcits and accommodated them so laxly that it debased the national currency,
sending Ghana in a downward growth spiral from which it has taken decades to recover.
10
3 J. Sachs and A. Warner, ‘Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies’, Journal of African Economies,
6 (1997), 335–76.
4 Easterly and Levine, ‘Africa’s Growth Tragedy’.
5 W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L’Overture, 1972).
6 K. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1965).
7 M. Lofchie, ‘The New Political Economy of Africa’, in David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg, eds, Political
Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994),
pp. 145–83.
8 R. Dumont, False Start in Africa (New York: Praeger, 1969); R. H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical
Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981).
9 C. Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996).
10 C.LeithandM.Lofchie,‘TheCaseofGhana’,inR.H.BatesandA.O.Krueger,eds,EconomicandPolitical
Interactions in Economic Policy Reform (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 225–93.406 HUMPHREYS AND BATES
Abacha and Achaempong were ofﬁcers who presided over military governments.
Others,suchasKwameNkrumahinGhanaandKennethKaundainZambia,werecivilians.
Butbecausetheypresidedoversingle-partysystems,theytoowereshelteredfromelectoral
accountability. In Ghana, the government of Nkrumah seized the earnings of export
agriculture to ﬁnance dozens of import substituting ﬁrms. The ﬁrms remained privately
proﬁtable because they were protected. The result was an inefﬁcient transfer of resources
from consumers to the political elites that dominated their boards and management.
11 In
Zambia, the government of Kenneth Kaunda maintained an overvalued exchange rate that
transferred the hard currency earned from copper exports to state-owned enterprises.
12 In
both countries, government policies imposed a tax on exports; but because of the
single-party system, the exporters could not organize in opposition to the government
policies. The result in both cases was a rise in trade deﬁcits and international debt.
Observingtheseandothercases,scholars–mostrecentlyvandeWalle
13–havefocused
on the domestic origins of Africa’s development crisis. They stress the inability, or
unwillingness, of states to implement policies that provide beneﬁts to the broader public
rather than to the governments themselves, even in the face of the pressures orchestrated
by the international ﬁnancial community. Activists and intellectuals have also pointed out
the political origins of economic decline in Africa.
14 For Africa to recover economically,
they argue, dictatorships and single-party regimes must give way to multi-party systems,
withfreedomtoorganizeandtochallengeincumbentgovernments.
15Theroadtoeconomic
recovery, they contend, lies in political reform, and especially in efforts to render
governments politically accountable.
16
Quantitative Accounts
In an effort to explain cross-national variation in rates of economic growth, economists
have ﬁtted a variety of econometric models to aggregate economic data.
17 Be these
equations based on neoclassical or endogenous growth theory, researchers have often
found it necessary to enter an ‘Africa dummy’. The dummy is included to account for all
things particular to Africa that are not accounted for by other explanatory variables. The
sign on the dummy is negative and its coefﬁcient signiﬁcant, thus implying that, all
else being equal, the economies of Africa achieve lower rates of economic growth than
do those in other regions. In 1991, Barro found that even controlling for the level of
public consumption and a measure of the distortion of markets, the dummy for Africa
11 T.Killick,DevelopmentEconomicsinAction:AStudyofEconomicPoliciesinGhana(London:Heinemann,
1978).
12 R. H. Bates and P. Collier, ‘The Case of Zambia’, in Bates and Krueger, eds, Economic and Political
Interactions in Economic Policy Reform (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 382–443.
13 See N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2001); also R. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).
14 SeeC.Achebe,AnthillsoftheSavannah(London:Heineman,1987);alsoAke,DemocracyandDevelopment
in Africa.
15 C. Ake, The Case for Democracy: African Governance in the 1990s (Atlanta, Ga.: Carter Center, 1990).
16 J. A. Wiseman, ed., Democracy and Political Change (London: Routledge, 1995); and R. Joseph, ‘Africa:
Rebirth of Freedom’, Journal of Democracy, 2 (1991), 11–24; and World Bank, Governance and Development
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1991); and G. Hyden and M. Bratton, Governance and Politics in Africa
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
17 R. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995).Political Institutions and Economic Policies 407
remained negative and signiﬁcant.
18 Controlling for measures of trade openness and ﬁscal
restraint, Barro and Lee replicate this result.
19 And even while adding ﬁnancial depth to
measures of trade openness and ﬁscal restraint, Easterly and Levine ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly
lower rate of growth among African nations.
20
Theevidenceofan‘African’effectalsocomesfromthesubjectiveratingsoftheworld’s
economies made by international investors. Investors appear to base their judgements on
such economic fundamentals as the level of foreign reserves, ﬁscal balance and debt. But,
asreportedbyCollierandPattillo,evenallowingforsuchfactors,theyplaceanadditional
discountonAfrica’seconomies.
21Asigniﬁcantandnegative‘Africadummy’consistently
entersequationsthatattempttoaccountforthescoresconferreduponnationsbythosewho
rate their attractiveness for foreign investors.
22
Somescholarsaccountforthiseffectbyconsideringgeographicfeaturesassociatedwith
Africa.
23 But many turn to explanations that are more political. Englebert stresses the
legitimacyofstatestructures;
24EasterlyandLevineemphasizeAfrica’sethnicdiversity.
25
Collierstressestheimportanceofformsofgovernment:ethnicmake-up,heargues,affects
rates of growth, but only in nations that lack democracy.
26 The unexpectedly low rates of
growth of the nations of Africa, he argues, may therefore derive fundamentally not from
their ethnic diversity, but rather from their lack of democratic institutions.
27
In a thoughtful review of this literature, Ndulu and O’Connell decompose the sources
ofgrowthbetweentheaccumulationoffactorsandthegrowthoftotalproductivity.
28They
attributeaportionofthelaginAfricangrowthratesovertheperiod1960–94tohighlevels
offertility,andthereforetoalowratiooflabourforcetopopulation;
29anotherportionthey
attribute to the slow accumulation of physical and human capital. But fully two-thirds of
Africa’s shortfall remains unexplained, they report, and they suggest that the unexplained
portion may result from political factors, and in particular, from authoritarian rule.
30 In a
18 R. Barro, ‘Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (1991),
407–43.
19 R. Barro and J-W. Lee, ‘Sources of Economic Growth’, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy 40 (University of Rochester, 1994), pp. 1–46.
20 EasterlyandLevine,‘Africa’sGrowthTragedy’.SeealsoP.CollierandJ.W.Gunning,‘ExplainingAfrica’s
Economic Performance’, Journal of Economic Literature, 37 (1999), 64–111. An important study that does not
identify an Africa speciﬁc effect is A. Hoefﬂer, ‘Econometric Studies of Growth, Convergence and Conﬂicts’
(doctoral dissertation, Oxford University, 1999).
21 See N. U. Haque, M. Nelson and D. J. Mathieson, ‘Risk in Africa: Its Causes and Its Effects on Investment’,
inP.CollierandC.Pattillo,eds,InvestmentandRiskinAfrica(Basingstoke,Hants.:Macmillan,1999),pp.33–70.
22 Collier and Pattillo, Investment and Risk in Africa.
23 Sachs and Warner, ‘Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies’.
24 P. Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
25 Easterly and Levine, ‘Africa’s Growth Tragedy’.
26 P. Collier, Ethnicity, Politics, and Economic Performance (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999).
27 Barro also explored the impact of levels of democracy (see R. Barro, ‘Democracy and Growth’, Journal of
Economic Growth, 1 (1996), 1–27). Changes in his measure (derived from R. Gastil, Freedom in the World
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982)) signiﬁcantly relate to changes in growth rates, with the middle level
of democracy associated with the most favourable rates of growth (Barro, ‘Democracy and Growth’, p. 14). Even
controlling for the level of democracy of their governments, however, Barro ﬁnds that the African cases exhibited
a signiﬁcantly lower average rate of growth.
28 B. Ndulu and S. A. O’Connell, ‘Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 13 (1999), 41–66.
29 See also D. Bloom and J. Sachs, ‘Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa’, Brookings
Papers in Economic Activity, 2 (1998), 207–95.
30 Ndulu and O’Connell, ‘Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa’, p. 45.408 HUMPHREYS AND BATES
globalstudy,Acemoglu,JohnsonandRobinsonusesettlermortalityratesasaninstrument
forcontemporaryinstitutionsandﬁndapositiverelationshipbetweenpoliticalinstitutions
and economic growth. Africa’s slow growth results, they imply, from its politics.
31
International Financial Institutions
As recounted in its ofﬁcial history, as the World Bank expanded its role in Africa, its
in-house project evaluations revealed a distressingly low rate of return: ‘More than any
other task the Bank had undertaken, its engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa sapped the
institution’s … conﬁdence’.
32 A primary reason for the failure of projects in the region,
the Bank determined, was the highly adverse economic environment resulting from
government policies.
33 In a subsequent study of Africa’s development, the World Bank
setasideargumentsbaseduponunforeseeableshocks,suchasdroughts,orexternalfactors,
such as declining terms of trade, and instead focused upon systematic and internal forces
that lowered the rate of return on investments and the rate of growth of its economies.
34
At the core of Africa’s economic crisis, it argued still later, lay poor public policies and
the lack of ‘political will’ to correct them.
35
Summary of Part I
Qualitative and quantitative accounts thus posit a causal link between political
accountability, the economic choices of governments and the performance of Africa’s
economies. But while many point out the political origins of Africa’s development crisis,
the arguments remain largely underspeciﬁed: in most cases, analysts either fail to identify
the mechanisms linking political institutions to policy choices or to provide empirical
support for their arguments. Building upon the work of Barro, Ferejohn, and Persson and
Tabellini, we seek to ﬁll this gap.
36 We ﬁrst develop the logic that links institutional and
economic constraints on the one hand to policy choices on the other. We then test the
arguments using data on political institutions (that come primarily from the World Bank’s
31 D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J. A. Robinson. ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An
Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 1369–401. Note, however, that Acemoglu and
Robinson do not analyse the political incentives to which particular institutions give rise – and that their measure
of institutions is a measure of policy outputs rather than of formal political structures.
32 D. Kapur, ‘The Weakness of Strength: The Challenge of Sub-Saharan Africa’, in D. Kapur, J. Lewis and
R. Webb, eds, The World Bank: Its First Half Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997),
pp. 683–804, at p. 720.
33 World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank, 1981).
34 WorldBank,Sub-SaharanAfrica:FromCrisistoSustainableGrowth(Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank,
1989).
35 See,forexample,WorldBank,‘AdjustmentinAfrica–Reforms,Results,andtheRoadAhead’,WorldBank
Policy Research Bulletin, 5 (1994).
36 R.J.Barro,‘TheControlofPoliticians:AnEconomicModel’,PublicChoice,14(1973),19–42;J.Ferejohn,
‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control’, Public Choice, 50 (1986), 5–26; T. Persson and G. Tabellini,
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000). See also C. Adam and
S. O’Connell, ‘Aid, Taxation, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Economics and Politics, 11 (1999),
225–54;NduluandO’Connell,‘GovernanceandGrowthinSub-SaharanAfrica’;andBruceJ.BuenodeMesquita,
J. Morrow, R. Siverson and A. Smith, ‘Institutions, Outcomes and the Survival of Leaders’ (Working Paper, Yale
University, 2000).Political Institutions and Economic Policies 409
Research Department and from researchers at Harvard University)
37 and data on public
policy(thatcomefromtheratingsofprivateinvestmentservicesandpublicinstitutions).
38
PART II: FROM POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS TO PUBLIC POLICY
As others (see references above) have done, we seek to link policy choices to political
institutions by casting the citizenry as a principal and the government as their agent. In
this section, we establish this link by outlining the logic of political accountability. We
provide a rigorous development in the Appendix and empirical tests in Part III.
Consistent with qualitative accounts of policy choices in Africa, our model takes a
scepticalviewofthemotivationsofgovernments.Governments,weassume,controlpublic
policy with a view to retaining ofﬁce and enjoying the beneﬁts of ofﬁce. Through their
policy choices, they induce the production of public goods – with which to enhance the
publicwelfare–andprivategoods–withwhichtorewardfavouredcitizens,orthemselves.
The value to a government of holding ofﬁce is increasing in the value of the private goods
that it can extract and consume. Being merely an agent, however, the government must
apportion sufﬁcient beneﬁts to a sufﬁcient number of citizens so that they will approve its
return to ofﬁce. Failing to secure that approval, the government must surrender power and
re-enter the ranks of the citizenry.
Citizens serve as the government’s principals. Subgroups of citizens are decisive in the
sense that they can ensure the government’s tenure in ofﬁce. A democracy is marked by
the fact that any majority is decisive. Alternatively, a smaller subset of the citizens may
be decisive, as in the case of an oligarchy or personalistic regime.
We assume that the government lacks the means to commit itself to fulﬁlling its
promises. The citizenry therefore discounts its pledges and instead focuses on its actual
performance. That is, they evaluate its behaviour ex post. They are able to constrain the
government’s behaviour ex ante, however, by adopting a strategy that posits a target for
thegovernment:alevelofbeneﬁtsthatthegovernmentmustproduceinordertobereturned
to ofﬁce. Should the government meet the performance criterion of a decisive group, then
this group can ‘renew the government’s contract’; should it fail, the group can then ‘ﬁre’
the government. In so far as the strategies of members of decisive groups alter the policy
choices of the government, the government is rendered accountable.
Whilecitizensarebackwardlooking,thegovernmentlooksforward:itshapesitschoices
in an effort to retain public ofﬁce. It adopts policies that enable it to maximize the private
beneﬁts it can extract through its use of public power. Under the constraints imposed by
the economy, to maximize its private payoffs, the government seeks to satisfy the citizens
by furnishing the lowest level of public goods and distributive beneﬁts that will fulﬁl the
performance standards of a decisive set of civilians. The mix of public and private goods
chosentomeetanygivenstandarddependsonthestructureoftheeconomy.Governments
ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to extract resources from economies in which resources are mobile
37 T. Beck, G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer and P. Walsh, ‘New Tools and New Tests in Comparative Political
Economy:TheDatabaseofPoliticalInstitutions’(WorkingPaper,TheWorldBank,2000);KarenFerreeandSmita
Singh, ‘Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Africa: 1970–1995’, in Steve Chan and James Scarritt, eds,
Coping with Globalization: Cross-National Patterns in Domestic Governance and Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Frank
Cass, 2002), pp. 89–120.
38 Political Risk Services, International Country Risk Guide (dataset available on-line at http://
www.countrydata.com/wizard/); see also discussion of the World Bank’s ‘Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment’ measure below.410 HUMPHREYS AND BATES
than they do from economies in which resources are immobile. They are therefore driven
toexchangepublicbeneﬁtsfortaxrevenuesintheﬁrsttoagreaterdegreethaninthesecond
kind of economy.
Political accountability thus renders the government an agent and the citizens its
principal. But the interests of the two are not fully aligned: the government possesses
private interests of its own and is therefore a less than perfect servant of the citizenry. The
relationship between the government and the citizens thus takes on the properties of a
game. In this game, the citizens move ﬁrst, choosing a minimum level of acceptable
performancebytheirgovernment.Knowinghowthecitizenshavechosen,thegovernment
thenchoosespublicpolicies,seekingtogainthemaximumprivatebeneﬁtsfromofﬁcethat
are consistent with re-selection. After its term has been completed, the citizens evaluate
thegovernment’sperformance.Ifsomedecisivegroupofcitizensapproves,itmaychoose
to renew the government’s contract. The game between the citizens and their government
is played over an inﬁnite number of periods of ﬁxed length; each player’s valuation of
utility is given by the sum of welfare in each period, discounted for time.
AssetoutintheAppendix,thereexistsanequilibriumforthisgameinwhichthestrategy
followed by citizens compels the government to produce more public goods and fewer
private beneﬁts for itself than it might otherwise desire. The Appendix thus provides a
formaltheoryofthepoliticalfoundationsofpolicychoice,demonstratinghowinstitutions
of accountability generate incentives that inﬂuence public policy in ways that enhance the
collective welfare.
The logic of accountability yields several empirical implications. Some ﬂow
immediately from the standard models, as advanced by Barro, Ferejohn, and Persson and
Tabellini (see footnote 36). First, for the logic to hold, governments should face
competitive electoral processes. The more competitive the electoral process, the greater
the level of public goods that governments are required to provide in order to remain in
ofﬁce. Secondly, for the ex post judgements of citizens to generate ex ante incentives for
policydecisions,thegovernmentmustbeforwardlooking.Thegovernment’sdiscountrate
– i.e. the rate at which it discounts payoffs or penalties occurring in later periods of time
– should therefore affect its behaviour. Should a government occupy an unstable regime
or face the risks of regime collapse, then it will tend to discount more highly than would
agovernmentthatismoresecurewithrespecttothefutureimpactofpresentpolicychoices.
Note that risk therefore plays a complex role: governments that are at risk of political
rejection conditional upon their performance within stable institutional environments
possess incentives to adopt public policies that are collectively rather than privately
beneﬁcial.Butgovernmentsthatareatriskasafunctionofexogenoussourcesofinstability
possess weak incentives.
The argument we advance (see Appendix) contains two additional, non-standard
features, however, and these yield additional implications. One concerns the size of the
decisive sets. Governments, according to our model, seek to gain ofﬁce at least cost; they
seek to maximize the beneﬁts of ofﬁce holding by minimizing the resources they must
divert to powerful citizens. All else being equal, the larger the set of citizens that a
governmentmustsatisfy,thelessefﬁcientistheuseofprivatetransferstosatisfyclients.
39
These considerations imply that the larger the size of the decisive sets, the less the
39 Persson and Tabellini, Political Economics, provide a discrete version of this result in order to characterize
differences between proportional representation (PR) and non-PR systems.Political Institutions and Economic Policies 411
governmentwillextractforitselfandthemoreinclineditwillbetorecruitpoliticalsupport
by providing public goods rather than distributive beneﬁts. Secondly, according to our
model, the nature of the economy inﬂuences the policy choices of governments. If
resources are mobile, then the costs of redistribution are high; the owners of assets will
shift them to activities that elude taxation. It thus becomes more difﬁcult for governments
to use extractive policies to retain the support of decisive groups. Conversely, if resources
are ﬁxed as, for example, in the case of economies that are heavily dependent on natural
resources, then the implication of our model, is that governments will be more inclined
to use public policy to appropriate private beneﬁts rather than to generate public goods.
The Appendix provides formal proofs of these arguments.
PART III: EMPIRICAL TESTING
The logic of accountability thus yields empirical propositions, rendering the arguments
subject to testing. To test these propositions, we assembled data on political institutions
and economic structures in Africa and from a global sample of countries. As is standard,
we fully capitalize the variable names; their deﬁnitions appear in Table 5.
TABLE 2 Country Policy and Institutional As-
sessments (CPIA)
Disaggregated elements of CPIA Index
I. Macroeconomic management
1. General macroeconomic performance
2. Fiscal policy
3. Management of external debt
4. Macroeconomic management capacity
5. Sustainability of structural reforms
II. Public sector management
1. Quality of budget and public investment process
2. Efﬁciency and equity of resource mobilization
3. Efﬁciency and equity of public expenditures
4. Accountability of the public service
III. Policies for sustainable and equitable growth
1. Trade policy
2. Foreign exchange regime
3. Financial stability and depth
4. Banking sector efﬁciency and resource mobilization
5. Property rights and rule-based governance
6. Competitive environment for the private sector
7. Factor and product markets
8. Environmental policies and regulations
IV. Policies for reducing inequalities
1. Poverty monitoring and analysis
2. Pro-poor targeting of programs
3. Safety nets
Rating scale:1low; 5high
Source: ‘Country Policy and Institutional Assessments’, Report on
1998 Ratings (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1988).412 HUMPHREYS AND BATES
Dependent Variables
Tostudytheimpactofinstitutionsonpolicychoices,weemploytwomeasures.Bothreﬂect
theassessmentsofinformedobservers.TheﬁrstcomesfromtheInternationalCountryRisk
Guide(ICRG)producedbyPoliticalRiskServices(PRS)andisderivedfromscoresgiven
by a panel of international investors.
40 Each year, the panel rates governments on a series
of dimensions, each capturing elements of political, economic and ﬁnancial risk to
investors. For each country, our measure, QUALITY, combines ratings of the
government’s propensity to engage in corruption and the government’s likelihood of
engaging in expropriation. To produce the measure, we weight these two ratings by the
loading derived from principal components estimation. The resulting score provides a
measure of the tendency to adopt distributive policies and to make opportunistic use of
public power.
WealsoemploytheWorldBank’sCountryPolicyandInstitutionalAssessment(CPIA),
an annual evaluation of the conduct of governments that have loans outstanding with the
Bank. The CPIA provides a measure of the World Bank’s evaluations of governments’
efforts to generate a sustainable macro-economic environment, free of major policy
distortions. It is in fact the main measure used in the recent and inﬂuential literature on
aid effectiveness, where it measures the extent to which governments provide publicly
regarding policies.
41 The Bank’s rating covers the policy performance of the government
in twenty speciﬁc areas, grouped into four major categories (see Table 2). Scoring the
country’s performance in each area from 1, for low, to 5, for high, the Bank calculates an
aggregate score, or CPIA, which is the unweighted average of the rating in each of the
twenty areas.
It is important to realize that the CPIA, while informative, is ﬂawed.
42 The CPIA
measures deviation from the set of policies that make up the so-called Washington
TABLE 3 Summary Statistics for Dependent
Variables
Rest of the
Variable SSA world World
QUALITY 0.53 0.18 0
(0.59) (0.95) (1.0)
CPIA 2.64 3.00 2.9
(0.74) (0.71) (0.74)
Note: This table reports the average scores for sub-Saharan Africa and
the rest of the world for each of the two dependent variables. Standard
deviations of the sample distributions are reported in parentheses.
40 http://www.countrydata.com/wizard.
41 See, for example, Paul Collier and David Dollar, ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction’, European
Economic Review, 46 (2002), 1475–500.
42 Regressing the aggregate score against measures of macro-economic balances – levels of government
consumption, ﬁscal deﬁcits, inﬂation and so on – shows the measure to yield highly signiﬁcant relationships with
objective measures of policy choices and enhances our conﬁdence in the measure. There are, however, some
technical concerns with the measure: it mixes assessments of policies with outcomes and it assigns equal weights
to each policy. The measure is both bounded and categorical, resulting in a distribution of errors that could
complicate statistical inference. Furthermore, there is evidence that the criteria for determining the score havePolitical Institutions and Economic Policies 413
TABLE 4 Growth and Policy Choice
SYSTEM 1 SYSTEM 2
Dependent variables Growth QUALITY Growth CPIA
QUALITY 1.248
(3.12)***
CPIA 1.757
(2.52)**
GDP growth (annual %) 0.085 0.09
(7.20)*** (8.21)***
Per capita GDP (lag) 1.682 0.105 2.132 0.186
(5.54)*** (10.67)*** (6.48)*** (10.05)***
Gross Domestic Investment
as a share of GDP 12.045 8.327
(7.88)*** (7.34)***
Life expectancy (logged) 11.037 13.597
(4.41)*** (5.54)***
Literacy rate 0.019 0.026
(2.09)** (2.86)***
LiteracyGDP 0 0
(2.80)*** (3.39)***
General government
consumption (% of GDP) 0.075 0.085
(3.44)*** (3.41)***
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.027 1.455
(2.04)** (2.88)***
COMPETITIVENESS 0.031 0.024
(3.58)*** (2.34)**
CHECKS 0.023 0.054
(1.83)* (3.49)***
AGRIPOP (Lag) 0.225 0.359
(1.94)* (2.69)***
PROBLEM (Lag) 0.195 0.07
(5.50)*** (1.64)
OIL 0.442 1.068
(2.64)*** (5.37)***
Year 0.07 0.012
(14.39)*** (2.81)***
Constant 41.588 140.402 56.211 21.459
(4.14)*** (14.47)*** (6.29)*** (2.56)**
Observations 973 973 1,109 1,109
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **signiﬁcant at 5%; ***signiﬁcant at
1%. The models have been jointly estimated using three-stage least squares (World sample). These models differ
from Barro’s standard model in a number of ways. First, annual data is used rather than quinquennial data.
Secondly, for reasons of data coverage, less rich education data is used: LiteracyGDP is related to Barro’s
interaction between GDP and human capital where literacy substitutes for Barro’s aggregate human capital
measure.Finally,inthecontextofthisarticle,ourmeasuresofQUALITYandCPIAsubstituteforBarro’smeasure
of market distortions, given by a measure of the black-market premium.
(F’note continued)
varied over time. Note that while the CPIA index is based in part on assessments of institutions, (a) these
assessments constitute but a minor portion of the total rating and (b) were the Bank raters inclined to give higher
ratings to countries that exhibited higher levels of political accountability, then this would bias us towards ﬁnding
such a positive correlation in the data, contrary to what we in fact ﬁnd (see below).414 HUMPHREYS AND BATES
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Consensus.
43Theextenttowhichthemeasurecapturespoliciesdeemedof‘socialbeneﬁt’
isopentochallenge:whiletheWorldBankmaybelievethatthesepoliciesgeneratepublic
beneﬁts, these views are not universally held in Africa.
44 As can be seen from the data
contained in Table 3, the policy choices of governments in Africa are rated by investors
and the World Bank more negatively than are the choices of governments in the rest of
the world.
Multiple studies ﬁnd strong relationships between such measures and economic growth
rates.
45 In Table 4, we provide further evidence that this relationship obtains for the two
dependent variables – QUALITY and CPIA – and for our sample.
46 By combining a
Barro-like growth regression (which includes the policy ratings) with an empirical model
of policy choice (which includes a measure of growth and other controls, see Table 5) into
asinglesystemofequationsusingthree-stageleastsquares,
47wegeneratecoefﬁcientsthat
provide measures of the relationship of policy to growth that partially account for
endogeneity. These results indicate that variation in our measures of policy choices are
associated with large differences in growth rates: a one standard deviation shift in
QUALITY and CPIA is associated with a shift of approximately 1.2 and 1.3 percentage
points in growth rates, respectively. Tables 3 and 4 thus highlight the signiﬁcance of our
exploration into the institutional determinants of policy decisions.
Independent Variables
The measures of the independent variables come from the ﬁles of the Africa Research
Program (ARP) at Harvard University;
48 the Database on Political Institutions (DPI)
compiled by Beck et al. and data released by the World Bank.
49 Table 5 reports the
deﬁnitions and distributions of these variables and the sources from which they were
drawn.
In describing these variables and our expectations of their relationship to measures of
policy performance, we proceed in a sequence that parallels our exposition of the logic of
political accountability, ﬁrst dwelling on institutions, then on the determinants of the
43 SeeJohnWilliamson,‘WhatWashingtonMeansbyPolicyReform’,inJohnWilliamson,ed.,LatinAmerican
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990),
pp. 7–20; also John Williamson, ed., The Role of Technocrats in Economic Policy Reform (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, 1994).
44 There is less doubt concerning the desirability of lower levels of expropriation. The simple correlation
between the two dependent variables is 0.56. See W. Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2001); see also J. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).
45 For a study employing the World Bank’s measure, see Collier and Dollar, ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty
Reduction’.ForastudyofeconomicgrowthwithPoliticalRiskServicesdataontheright-handside,seeAcemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins’.
46 Indeed each of these measures has appeared as an explanatory variable in growth regressions elsewhere. For
a study employing the World Bank’s measure, see Collier and Dollar, ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction’.
For a study of economic growth with Political Risk Services data on the right-hand side, see Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins’.
47 The variables used in this table are described below. See Table 5 for summary statistics.
48 http://africa.gov.harvard.edu.
49 Becketal.,‘NewToolsandNewTestsinComparativePoliticalEconomy’;WorldBank,WorldDevelopment
Indicators (Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press, 2000).Political Institutions and Economic Policies 417
governments’ discount rate, then on the nature of the decisive sets, and ﬁnally on the
structure of the economy.
Institutions:Accordingtothelogicofaccountability,theincentivesthatdrivegovernment
responsesbitebecausethegovernmentfacestheprospectsofejectionfromofﬁce.Tobring
the logic to bear on debates over the role of electoral competition in economic reform,
especially in Africa, we employ a measure of electoral COMPETITION. By the rules
governingthecreationofthismeasure,apolityreceivesascoreof1ifthereisnoexecutive
in place; 2 if there is a non-elected executive; 3 if there is an elected executive but no
electoral competition; 4 if there is an elected executive, and competition between
candidates but not between parties (because opposition parties are banned); 5 if there is
an elected executive and competition between candidates but not between parties (even
thoughoppositionpartiesarelegal);and6ifthereisanelectedexecutive,withcompetition
betweencandidatesbackedbyopposingpartiestakingplaceduringtheelectoralcampaign.
A score of 7 is accorded in the DPI if the executive’s vote share is less than 75 per cent.
Discount rate. As argued above, the strength of the incentives to which institutions of
accountability give rise depends upon the government’s rate of discount. Affecting the
value the government places upon future beneﬁts from ofﬁce is its assessment of political
risk. To capture the level of political risk arising from political instability, we employ a
measure of the instability of a given regime developed by the State Failure Task Force.
50
This measure – which we call PROBLEM – indicates whether each country was a part of
the State Failure Task Force’s ‘problem set’ in the previous year by virtue of being
embroiled in a civil conﬂict, undergoing extreme levels of violence or experiencing an
adverse regime change.
51 As a secondary indicator we also employed a measure of the
predicted likelihood of being within the task force Problem Set conditional upon past
information for any point in time.
Properties of the decisive sets. According to the logic of the model, the degree to which
agovernmentwillemploypoliticalpowertoproducecollectivebeneﬁtsdependsuponthe
size of the decisive sets. The larger the number of veto points within the institutions of
government, the more inclusive the decisive set must be. The logic of the model therefore
suggests that the larger the number of veto points in the institutions of government, the
morelikelywillpolicymakersbetopromotethecreationofcollectivegoods.Thevariable,
CHECKS, is based upon the number of independent parts of the political process. It uses
information regarding the number of different parties in a governing coalition and the
extent to which there is a competitive legislature independent of the president or prime
minister’s party.
52
Economic structures. As captured in the model provided in the Appendix, policy makers
areconstrainedbythetypesofeconomiesinwhichtheyfunction.Inparticular,ifeconomic
50 J. Goldstone et al., State Failure Task Force Project, Phase III Report (McLean, Va.: SAIC, 2003).
51 More information on this measure can be found on the homepage of the State Failure Task Force:
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/sfcodebk.htm.
52 Each of the DPI variables, CHECKS1 and CHECKS2 were used in the analysis. See the Appendix for a full
deﬁnition of these variables.418 HUMPHREYS AND BATES
agentsareabletoprotectthemselvesfrompredationbyreducingproductionorbymoving
their assets, then extractive policies will yield fewer beneﬁts to government.
We use two variables to capture the ease with which rents can be extracted. The ﬁrst,
AGRICPOP, measures the share of the population that is dependent upon agricultural
production. The second, OIL, measures the value of oil production as a share of the gross
domesticproduct(GDP).Ineachcaseweexpectnegativerelationsbetweenthesemeasures
of economic structure and performance on the dependent variable.
Table 6 presents data from the Africa sample on key variables in the analysis. As might
beexpected,BotswanaandSouthAfricareceivethehighestratingsfromprivateinvestors;
they also exhibit the highest average level of political competition. As also might be
expected, the Democratic Republic of Congo receives the lowest rating from private
investors as well as one of the lowest average levels of political competition. Some – such
as Namibia – exhibit highly negative ratings on one dimension but highly positive scores
on the other. Most exhibit investor ratings that place them signiﬁcantly below the global
average and reﬂect an absence of political competition.
TABLE 6 Countries Included in Estimates in Tables 7 and 8
Average Average
COUNTRY QUALITY COMPETITION
Botswana 0.4 6.0
South Africa 0.3 6.5
Gabon 0.3 3.4
Cote d’Ivoire 0.2 3.7
Gambia, The 0.1 6.6
Tanzania 0.1 3.0
Cameroon 0.1 3.5
Malawi 0.2 2.2
Kenya 0.2 3.1
Ghana 0.3 3.2
Mozambique 0.3 2.7
Togo 0.3 3.0
Senegal 0.4 5.8
Zimbabwe 0.4 6.3
Guinea 0.4 3.0
Ethiopia 0.5 2.0
Zambia 0.6 3.9
Niger 0.6 2.7
Nigeria 0.7 3.0
Sierra Leone 0.7 2.8
Burkina Faso 0.7 2.6
Angola 0.8 3.3
Republic of Congo 0.8 2.4
Uganda 0.9 3.2
Guinea-Bissau 0.9 2.7
Namibia 0.9 6.8
Madagascar 1.1 4.8
Mali 1.2 3.2
Democratic Republic
of Congo 1.3 2.9Political Institutions and Economic Policies 419
Restriction on the use of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessments prevents the
reporting of these data for speciﬁc countries.
Control Variables
We include a small set of variables to control for the impact of the wealth of the country,
GDP growth rates and time. We also add an Africa dummy in the pooled regressions that
employtheglobaldataset.Thisvariableprovidesanimportantcheckonourargument.For
if our reasoning provides an adequate theory of the policy preferences of Africa’s
governments, then the coefﬁcient on the African dummy should fail to attain statistical
signiﬁcance, when the variables that capture the logic of accountability are entered into
the analysis.
53
Estimation
We ﬁrst estimate our statistical models using a pooled sample of observations. We then
re-estimate each model introducing country-speciﬁc effects and the lag of the dependent
variable. Since a ﬁxed-effects structure that includes a lagged dependent variable may
introduce bias in ﬁnite samples,
54 we report a third version of each model that employs
the Arrelano and Bond Generalized Method of Moments estimator.
55
Results and Discussion
In Tables 7 and 8 below, we present two sets of results. Table 7 presents results for
QUALITY for both an African and a world sample. Table 8 presents similar results for
CPIA. In the case of QUALITY, the analysis is based upon data from 103–4 nations, of
which 28–9 are from Africa, depending on data availability; the samples cover the period
1985–95. In the case of CPIA, the global sample includes 95–6 nations and the African
sample 36–7 and both cover the period 1975–90.
We interpret positive coefﬁcients for the variables relating to QUALITY as suggesting
that higher levels of the variable yield a lower tendency for the government to employ
public powers to extract private beneﬁts from the economy. In the case of CPIA, we
interpret positive coefﬁcients as suggesting that higher levels of the independent variable
yield a stronger tendency on the part of governments to use public policy to generate a
stable macro-economic environment.
Turning ﬁrst to the control variables, we note a pronounced tendency for hysteresis in
53 Westressthattheresultspresentedheredonottakeaccountofthepossibleimpactofpolicyonthesupposedly
independentvariables.Ourresultsarerobusttothereplacementofindependentvariableswiththeirlags;however,
save in the estimates reported in Table 3, we have yet to model these endogenous relationships directly. We note
howeverthatinsofaraspublicgoodsprovision,asrecordedbytheWorldBank,mayincreasethecompetitiveness
of institutions, this should lead to an upward bias in the estimated correlation, and hence, a bias against our result.
54 Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 2002).
55 M. Arellano and S. Bond, ‘Some Tests of Speciﬁcation for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an
Application to Employment Equations’, Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1991), 277–97. The results reported do
not take account of the categorical and censored nature of the dependent variable. While formally categorical, the
dependent variables in fact contain as many as thirty values. And although formally bounded, there is little
clustering of data on the boundaries. We therefore ﬁnd that employing Tobit models made little impact on our
estimates.420 HUMPHREYS AND BATES
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public policy: the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients on the lagged dependent
variablesindicatethatpolicies,oncechosen,tendtopersist.Asexpected,wealthandGDP
growth are associated with more favourable policy ratings, although we are reluctant to
give a causal explanation to this correlation.
Turning to the theoretically imortant variables:
Institutions. According to debates over political reform in Africa and to the logic of our
argument, the spur to self-restraint originates from the risks inherent in reselection.
WhenusingQUALITYasameasureofpolicychoice,weencountertheexpectedresults
(Models I–VI). Both the African and global samples offer evidence of a relationship
between electoral competition and policy performance. These results are strongly
signiﬁcant in all but one speciﬁcation. The magnitudes of the coefﬁcients suggest that an
increase in competitiveness from the lowest to the highest value is associated with an
increase in the QUALITY score of approximately a ﬁfth of a standard deviation. Based
on the estimates contained in Table 4, this magnitude of policy change implies an increase
in the growth rate of approximately a quarter of a percentage point.
We ﬁnd however that when we use the CPIA as a measure of policy choice, then there
is no evidence for a relation between institutions and policy choice, once we control for
the impact of other factors. Indeed, in some models there is (weak) evidence that, when
subject to the spur of electoral competition, governments choose policies that distort the
macro economy (Models XI and XII).
Discount rate. The data provide evidence of the impact of discounting. If a government
is sufﬁciently unstable to fall into the State Failure Task Force’s problem set (i.e.
PROBLEM1), the policy environment deteriorates for private investors, as measured
by QUALITY (Table 7). The same relationship holds, but more weakly, for the World
Bank ratings of government policies in the global sample. Higher levels of regime
instability tend to associate with opportunistic policy making. The magnitudes in Models
I, II, IV and V associate instability with a fall in QUALITY of between a tenth and a ﬁfth
of a standard deviation.
Decisive groups. The formal model underscores the importance of a third set of variables:
those relating to the size of the decisive coalitions. The larger the size of its core
constituency, the logic suggests, the stronger the incentives for the government to reward
it through the production of public goods.
The pooled regressions suggest that governments that face multiple veto points – i.e.
that are constrained by checks and balances – adopt policies that elicit higher ratings. This
is true for both dependent variables and for both samples in the pooled regressions, but
the relationship is not observed when modelled using ﬁxed effects. These institutional
features are ‘slow moving’, however. Possibly for that reason, measures of their impact
fail to emerge in the equations that use differenced values of the variables.
Thenatureoftheeconomy.Whencorrectedforbiasarisingfromtheincidenceofalagged
dependent variable, there is scattered evidence in the Africa sample that increases in the
importance of primary products in the private economy lead to the adoption of
self-interested policies.
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regressions support the hypothesized relationship between the costs of private goods
extraction and the choices of governments. The equations that employ differenced data do
not, however; and the coefﬁcient of OIL in one such equation – that in the global sample,
using QUAL as a dependent variable and GMM methods of estimation – yields evidence
against our argument.
More consistent is the evidence of the impact of agriculturally dependent populations:
governmentsincountriesinwhichthepopulationislargelyagriculturaltendtoadoptmore
distributive policies. The sign on our measure of agricultural populations is negative in all
samples and for both dependent variables. It fails to attain signiﬁcance in all models,
however, particularly those employing the Arrelano and Bond estimator.
While weak, the evidence for a relationship between factor mobility and policy is
importantinitsownright.Itunderscoresthatwhenattemptingtoexplainthepolicychoices
of governments, we should look not only at the proclivities of political elites and the
institutionalconstraintsunderwhichtheylabour,butalsoatthestructureoftheeconomies
that they govern.
56 Given that Africa’s economies are largely agricultural in nature, and
that the most valuable industries are based on resource extraction, its governments face
fewer costs when themselves engaging in extractive policies, and therefore face fewer
incentives to refrain from predatory policy making.
Lastly, we note that the African dummy in the global sample in Tables 7 and 8 have
insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients. Viewed within the perspective of our model of policy choice,
African governments behave in ways that are indistinguishable from governments
elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
Employing a simple theoretically driven model, we have identiﬁed properties of national
economies and political institutions that signiﬁcantly inﬂuence policy choices by African
governments. Some are economic. Governments whose economic base is immobile are
more likely to engage in predation. Others are political. Africa is wracked with political
instability and private investors ﬁnd unstable governments to behave more opportunisti-
cally. Governments subject to checks and balances behave with greater restraint than do
thoselessconstrained,thedatasuggest.And,inthecaseofmeasuresdevelopedforprivate
investors, governments that are subject to electoral competition are more likely to employ
public power to produce collective goods rather than to extract private beneﬁts. Given the
evidence from Table 4, these differences matter: governments whose economic and
political endowments predispose them to choose ‘better’ policies tend to secure higher
rates of economic growth.
We must emphasize, however, that the magnitude and signiﬁcance of these effects vary
considerably by speciﬁcation and as a function of the samples and equations employed.
Aftercontrollingforcoredeterminantsofpolicychoice(i.e.thosederivedfromqualitative
accounts and formal theory) we ﬁnd that much of the variation in policy choices in Africa
still remains unaccounted for.
In closing, we wish to draw attention to a striking anomaly. While the relation between
competitive institutions and the data from private investor ratings consistently conforms
56 In so far as the structures of economies are themselves a function of the policy choices of governments and
subsequentgrowthrates,thisanalysissuggeststhepossibilityofmultipleequilibria,withsomeeconomiesresiding
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to the logic of accountability, the relationship with the World Bank ratings of policy
performance does not. The ﬁrst row of Table 8 is singularly devoid of signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients:wefailtoﬁndanyevidencethatcompetitiveelectoralprocessesarepositively
associated with policy choices as advocated by the World Bank.
The most direct interpretation of this result is that the results reﬂect the political
unpopularity of stabilization policies.
57 Our empirical estimates represent a test of the
model of accountability only if citizens favour the kind of non-distortionary policies rated
highly by the World Bank. But evidence from Afrobarometer surveys indicate that while
African populations support some micro-economic reforms (such as the introduction of
user fees), they do not favour adjustments that accompany the tightening of macro-
economic policies.
58 Rather than regarding these adjustments as providing a public good,
they view them as beneﬁting the few at the expense of the many.
59 In addition, the logic
of accountability presumes that governments make choices in anticipation of the citizens’
preferences for the payoffs that such policies may provide. Our results are consistent with
the view that, despite the growth implications of World Bank policies, African
governments believed that citizens prefer outcomes generated by policies that violate the
tenets of the Washington consensus.
60 Our ﬁndings thus suggest that while the 1980s and
1990s were periods of major political and economic reforms – as the latter is understood
by the World Bank – these reforms were not mutually re-enforcing.
APPENDIX: FORMAL RESULTS
The Model
Consider an economy with N individuals, indexed by j{1,2, …, N} in which production is governed by
an agent – the government – that manages the transformation between public goods – denoted by g – and
private goods – denoted by f, subject to the constraint that:
fg1, f, g, 0, [(N1)/2]2. (1)
The lower is  the more g can be produced for any f forgone; or conversely the more public goods must
be forgone to extract private beneﬁts. Private goods may be distributed costlessly to private citizens – the
principals – and to the government itself, with f j denoting the allocation to each, subject to fjf j. The
rentsretainedbytheagentarewrittenrf 1.Theagent’soutputthenisdescribedbythe(N1)-dimensional
vector (g,{f j}). Per-period welfare of the government is given simply by r. The per-period welfare of each
citizen is given by the quasilinear function:61
57 In effect, our models test the joint hypothesis of the logic of accountability and the popularity of particular
policy options. Finer measures are needed to separate these hypotheses.
58 Afrobarometer, ‘Popular Attitudes to Markets, Selected African Countries, 1999–2000’, Afrobarometer
Homepage: http://www.afrobarometer.org/survey2.html consulted 10 October 2002.
59 In particular, the studies found that, perhaps because they value the services provided by government or the
income from government jobs, Africans do not support policies that cut the size of the public sector. The stylized
reporting of the results from the Afrobarometer ﬁndings reﬂect the opinions of majorities in all twelve countries
with the sole exception of Tanzania where respondents were more supportive of structural adjustment and, in
particular, of the contraction of the public sector.
60 And evidence reported by Block and Block, Singh et al. underscore the importance of electoral cycles in
Africa’s economies. See S. A. Block, Political Business Cycles, Democratization, and Economic Performance:
The Case of Africa (Medford, Mass.: Tufts University, 1999) and S. A. Block et al., ‘Multiparty Competition,
Founding Elections, and Political Business Cycles in Africa’, CID Working Papers, 80 (2001), http://
www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwip/080.htm.
61 The argument is readily extended to more general functional forms.Political Institutions and Economic Policies 427
wjgf j, j2, 3,… ,N.
The utilitarian social welfare function, given by (N1)gf j is increasing in the creation of public
goods and so at the optimum yields (subject to the constraints in (1)), f0, g1/, w10. In contrast,
the optimal set of policies, from the government’s perspective, is given by g0, f1, f j0 for j1,
and rf11, yielding w11.
Assume that all citizens are equal in their powers and that the support of any M citizens is sufﬁcient to
maintain the agent in ofﬁce. With some abuse of notation, we also let M denote an arbitrary coalition of
size M.
Thegamebetweenthecitizensandtheirgovernmentisplayedoveraninﬁnitenumberofperiodsofﬁxed
length; a player’s valuation of utility is given by the sum of welfare in each period, discounted for time
at constant common rate (0,1). In each period we distinguish three phases of play. In the ﬁrst, each
citizen unilaterally selects a minimum satisfaction level,  j. In the second, the government selects policy.
In the third, principals choose non-cooperatively whether to take some costless action to return the
government to ofﬁce. If M citizens choose to return the government to ofﬁce, they succeed in doing so.
If no M citizens support the government, it remains in power nonetheless with probability q(0,1).
Otherwise, with probability 1q, the government is dismissed and a new one is installed. In either case,
play returns to the ﬁrst phase in which principals can again choose performance criteria for the new term
of ofﬁce.
Equilibrium
We look for equilibria in which citizens employ retrospective voting rules with per-period welfare cutoff
points { j} and the government undertakes actions that are feasible; that meet the demands of some set
of M principals; and that leave no incentive for any principal to alter her strategies. In what follows we
demonstrate that such an equilibrium obtains in which all principals’ cut-off points are satisﬁed by the
production of public goods, the government alone consumes private goods, and the equilibrium level of
public goods is (weakly) increasing in  and M, and decreasing in q and .
Deﬁnition and Benchmarks
To characterize equilibrium in this game, we use the following deﬁnition and benchmarks:
Deﬁnition: Principal’s Reselection Decision Rule. Let Di(g,{fi},i){0, 1} denote respectively the
decisions by individual i to act against or in support of the reselection of the incumbent, conditional upon
the output of the principal and the prior demands of the agent.
Note that two benchmark values for g are given as follows.
The Participation Constraint Benchmark [PC]. Should the government act opportunistically it can choose
its ideal output, yielding r 1. If, in consequence, it fails to attain the support of M principals, then, with
probability (1q), it will consume an out-of-ofﬁce payoff of 0 for all future periods. To avoid such
opportunistic behaviour, an agent’s returns from satisfying the demands of principals should provide an
outcome at least as beneﬁcial as she may expect from this optimizing behaviour. Letting gPC denote the
upperboundonthelevelofgthatastrategicgovernmentwillbewillingtoproducewhileseekingtoremain
in ofﬁce, and assuming stationarity, we then have:62
gPC


1q
1q
. (2)
62 This is found by equating the payoff for acting opportunistically, V
opp
t 1qVt1, with the payoff for
producing gPC and subsequently being reappointed: V
coop
t 1gPCVt1. Assuming stationarity, then with
V
coop
t V
opp
t , we have V
coop
t Vt1 and can solve for gPC.428 HUMPHREYS AND BATES
Feasibility Constraint Benchmark [FC]. A second benchmark is the value of g below which citizens are
so dissatisﬁed with the level of public goods provision that the government cannot feasibly purchase the
support of M citizens for reduced public goods provision. This value is given by:63
gFC
M
2
2
. (3)
When ggFC, then the government can ﬁnd M players that will be willing to accept a reduction in g in
exchange for some feasible increase in f. When ggFC it is technically infeasible for the government to
reduce g and compensate M players for the loss.
Equilibrium. We now prove the following result:
Claim: The strategy proﬁle {* i}i{2,3, …, N},( g*, {f* i}iN), {D* i}i{2,3, …, N} characterizes a sub-game
perfect equilibrium if in every period:
1. j*min(gFC, gPC) for all j1.
2. (g*, {f* j}jN) maximizes f 1 subject to the constraints that for some set M, g*f i** i for all i in
M, f*g*1 and g*gPC; if no maximum exists satisfying these constraints, then f*1, g*0.
3. Dj1 if and only if wii.
On the equilibrium path: * j g*min(gFC, gPC) for all j1, f 1*f*1g*, and f j*0 and
Dj1 for j1.
Proof. To prove the result we employ the one-stage deviation principle: we demonstrate that given the
strategies of the other players, no deviation for any single period can improve any player’s payoff.64
Consider ﬁrst the case where gFCgPC. In this case we claim that on the equilibrium path g*gFC* j
for all j1. We wish to demonstrate that (a) the participation constraint of the policy maker is satisﬁed,
(b) the output choice (gFC,{1gFC, 0}) is optimal for the agent, (c) the principals have no incentive to
alter their demands and (d) the principals have an incentive to follow the retrospective selection rule. Note
ﬁrst that since g*gFCgPC the participation constraint is satisﬁed. Note next that to maximize f 1 subject
to fg1, since g*gPC, the policy choice that provides M players with utility igFC and that
maximizes the agent’s utility involves producing gFC and allocating all of the private goods to the agent.
Hence, the principals’ demands are met purely by the public good. To check that this is optimal for the
agent, note that if g is greater than (or less than) gFC, the agent can increase her income, while satisfying
principals, by reducing (or increasing) g. Next, since all utility gained by principals derives from
consumption of public goods, there are no gains attached to being an element of M and hence no reduction
indemandswillimprovethewelfareofanyprincipal;anyincreaseindemandsbyprincipaliwillbewithout
effectastheagentwillexcludeprincipalifromthesetshesatisﬁes.Sinceeachprincipal’sdecisiontosupport
the incumbent is costless, there is in this game no incentive to deviate from the retrospective rule strategy.
Consider next the case where gPCgFC. Again, since the agent produces gPC and consumes all of f, her
participation constraint is met. Since gPCgFC, the cheapest way to produce igPC for M players is to
produce the output (gPC,{ 1 PC,0}), since, if ggFC the agent has an incentive to increase g while
compensating principals in M to the point where their demands are met. Again, since all utility gained by
principals derives from consumption of public goods, no reduction in demands will improve the welfare
of any principal and no increase in demands will be satisﬁed. Again, since each principal’s decision to
support the incumbent is costless, there is in this game no incentive to deviate from the retrospective rule
strategy.
Comparative statics. From inspection of (2) we note that gPC is increasing in , and decreasing in q and
. By inspection of (3) we have that gFC is increasing in M and decreasing in . From Claim 1 we have
then that g* is (weakly) increasing in  and M, and decreasing in q and .
63 This is found by solving for the value of g for which: M(	w
j/	g)	f/	g0o r( M/2g)0.
64 See, for example, D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995),
pp. 108–10.Reproducedwithpermissionofthecopyrightowner.Furtherreproductionprohibitedwithoutpermission.